The 'one country, two systems' structure established to govern the relationship between Hong Kong SAR and Mainland China was an innovative and comprehensive solution to particular economic and political challenges posed by the return of Hong Kong to the PRC in 1997. At the time of the drafting of the Basic Law, the integration of the colony into the regional economy of Southeast China through outward FDI had already begun, and from the mid-1980s this process facilitated the transformation of the Hong Kong economy from a manufacturing base to one dominated by financial and commercial services. It was recognised on both sides of the negotiations that the territory's viability and future prosperity relied on retaining independence over a range of key fundamentals, including a separate and independent currency and monetary system that was at the foundation of Hong Kong's attraction as an international financial centre for the PRC and also for the rest of the Asian region. An important credibility mechanism for the HK$ (as for the inconvertible RMB at this time) was the exchange rate link to the US$. Since this was also the anchor for the RMB after 1997, the linked rate system kept the relationship between the RMB and the HK$ stable. 
foreign banks into operating the exchange rate system. King recounts how during the crisis caused by the rise in the silver price in 1933-34 H.H. Kung and TV Soong of the Bank of China drew Henchman of the Hongkong Bank into a secret partnership to support the exchange rate of the Chinese dollar. His success earned him a gold wristwatch and the confidence of Soong and Kung that put the Hongkong Bank at the forefront of support schemes over the next few years. 5 Although the new Communist regime after 1949 severely restricted the activities of foreign banks and most extracted themselves from China during the early 1950s, the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank (HSBC) maintained its presence through these difficult years and was able to restore some of its business from the mid-1950s.
Relations between the Bank of China, the HSBC and the Hong Kong government were cordial and generally functioned well. 6 However, there were delicate political aspects of the Bank of China's role in Hong Kong. In 1961, the Bank of China requested subsidised land to build workers' accommodation but the project was delayed because the land needed to be cleared of 1500 squatters. The Political
Advisor recommended to the Colonial Secretary that
'I feel that we should be no more or less helpful to the BoC than we would be to any other employer wishing to take similar action. What we want to avoid doing is creating the impression that for political reasons we are putting obstacles in the BoCs way.' 7 Ten years later, however, when the question of land for workers' housing arose again, the Director of Special Branch advised that from an internal security viewpoint it is undesirable to allow the BoC or any other CPG [PRC] organization to build further large fortress-type buildings, especially on road junctions or other strategic locations. Hence special Branch would wish to be consulted on any sites which may be offered to the bank. 8 While the Bank of China was the most prominent Mainland-controlled bank in Hong Kong it was not the largest. By 1970 there were 13 PRC-controlled banks in
Hong Kong with a total of 55 branches. 9 They included the Bank of China, other banks registered on the Mainland, and banks registered in Hong Kong but controlled by the PRC.
3 The Bank of China was undoubtedly the most politically influential PRC bank in Hong Kong but Nanyang Commercial Bank (locally registered in Hong Kong) had the largest local deposits and advances. Figure 1 shows the growth in total assets and deposits of Nanyang Commercial Bank. The rate of growth was interrupted by the communist disturbances in Hong Kong in Spring 1967 that affected all PRC banks adversely, and it took several years to recover its position. In the boom of the early 1970s, however, the bank grew very quickly. 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
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While the growth of deposits was sustained at the same rate as for the banking system as a whole through most of 1969, there was an absolute fall in the level of deposits from May to July 1970. The value of deposits then recovered, but no longer grew at the same pace as the banking system as a whole. This slower growth rate was due to a stagnation in time deposits, which were the most severely affected by the 1967 disturbances. Another feature of the Mainland Chinese banks was the low ratio of local advances to deposits, which led to high liquidity ratios. Figure 5 shows that most PRC banks were not engaged in substantial lending to customers in Hong Kong but were mainly collecting deposits for other uses, particularly to be channelled overseas. Only three small PRC banks met the average ratio of loans to deposits for locally incorporated banks. When deposits were rising quickly in the years before 1967, advances lagged behind. Local Chinese Banks Figure 6 shows the high levels of liquidity in Mainland Chinese banks compared with either other foreign or locally registered banks. Information the nature of the liquidity is available only for December 1966 when it was calculated that 80% of the overall liquidity of Chinese mainland banks was held overseas. The other 20% was held in cash and net bank balances in Hong Kong. About 70% of these overseas liquid assets were held in China, and the rest in London. 12 As China's foreign trade bank, the Bank of China predictably held the largest balances on the Mainland, accounting for about 35% of the total and over half of mainland banks' assets in the UK. While the Nanyang Commercial Bank was more heavily involved in local lending, it was also the next largest holder of overseas balances, accounting for 15% of the total held in China and 21% of the total balances in the UK. In all, 87% of mainland banks' assets in China were bank deposits and money at call and only a small proportion were commercial bills. 
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The RMB appreciated after the 1967 exchange rate adjustments but was then stable China's total import bill for that year. 24 Given this evidence of substantial purchases of sterling through Hong Kong, a stable exchange rate between the HK$ and sterling was particularly important for China. China earned a substantial surplus in foreign exchange from exports of price inelastic products such as food and water to Hong Kong. 27 The trade balance averaged HK$2.5b per year from 1966-69 but then increased sharply during the early 1970s to HK$5.4b in 1973. Moreover, the proportion of these exports that were consumed in Hong Kong rather than re-exported remained at about 75% until 1976.
The exchange rate between the Hong Kong dollar and other currencies was therefore of vital interest to China since the surplus with Hong Kong was used to pay for imports from elsewhere. The proceeds of exports to Hong Kong were determined by the state-set RMB prices of exports to Hong Kong and by the exchange rate between the RMB and HK$. In common with other Comecon countries, to improve foreign exchange earnings China used a combination of exchange rate appreciation and price 16 manipulation. Raising food prices generated friction between Hong Kong and China so the management of the balance between the two countries was a delicate matter.
This system was tested when two days after the devaluation of November 1967, China announced that the RMB would not be devalued against the USD, increasing the HK$ price of Chinese goods since the HK$ initially followed sterling in a 14%
depreciation. This provoked vigorous debate in Hong Kong among industrialists and government officials (who sought to contain inflationary pressure on wages) and banks (who stood to loose from uncovered forward positions). 28 In the end, the Peking in the end decides which parity is correct for the colony. If the US dollar weakens, Peking will signal its desire for new arrangements for the colony's currency by devaluing the Hongkong dollar against the RMB. Unlike other economies, Hongkong cannot simply choose its own rate of exchange, or its links with other countries, on the basis of its export interests alone. Hongkong, to survive, must maintain its value to China. 33 When the US$ was devalued against gold in December 1971, the HK$ continued at the same peg to sterling (a revaluation of 8.57% against the US$), citing the dangers to the cost of living posed by higher import prices if the HK$ were devalued against sterling, and therefore the RMB. The Financial Secretary revealed publicly that a lesser revaluation of perhaps 6% only had been considered by was rejected because of the projected rise in the import bill of 3.5%. 34 In January 1972 the RMB followed to keep in line with the HK$. The Governor insisted that 'I would of course deplore anything which appeared to reduce the link with the UK, but such a move could be presented as a purely temporary measure pending the return of sterling to a new fixed parity, and I feel sure it would be seen, just as the float is seen, as something ephemeral'. 37 The HSBC's view was that once the link to sterling had been broken, the government's stated intention to revert to sterling once that currency had stabilised was 'most illogical'. 38 The British Treasury and Foreign Office tried to persuade MacLehose to maintain the link to sterling but were not successful. 39 The Bank of England believed that the Hong Kong authorities would have preferred to keep the link with sterling, but were persuaded that if sterling floated down too low then this would cause inflation because of the rise in the cost of imports from China.
China was the largest supplier of the imports that directly affected wage ratesfood and water. From 1967 From -1980 Hong Kong imported about 50% of its domestic food consumption from China alone. 40 China accounted for 80-85% of live animal imports at this time and Chau has argued that mainland food products were particularly important for working class Chinese diets. 41 Figure 15 shows that the price of foodstuffs was rising in 1970-72 faster than the overall Consumer Price Index for low-income households although the sharpest increase did not come until world prices rose in 1973. 42 Nominal wages, however, had reached an inflection point in 1970 to a higher rate of growth. These developments help to explain the enhanced sensitivity of the government and employers to the cost of living, although Chau did not detect a direct relationship between wages and prices.
19 against the HK$ to RMB39.73/HK$100 and 2.2% higher against the US$. As the Governor stated, 'in other words, their response to our announcement that we were temporarily pegging the HK$ to the US$ has been exactly as we predicted'. 44 He estimated that the revaluation of the RMB would raise import prices by 6% causing a 1.5% rise in the cost of living. 45 In 2007, Hong Kong imports about 70% of food from the Mainland, exaggerating the potential impact of RMB appreciation on the cost of living for lower income earners. It is estimated that a 5% appreciation of the RMB against the HK$ would generate a 1% increase in the CPI. 46 There is, therefore, continuity in the sensitivity of Hong Kong's economy to exchange rate policy on the mainland.
As July 1972 progressed the HK$ slumped to the bottom of its band against the US$ but Hong Kong did not have reserves of US$ to defend the rate. Instead, the 20 support the rate. At this point the Hong Kong government reported that they were running out of sterling cash and would soon need to liquidate sterling securities.
Sandberg of HSBC believed that Haddon-Cave had picked the exchange rate of HK$5.65/USD 'arbitrarily' and that the rate was too high from the outset. He advised
Haddon-Cave that
Cutting ourselves off from sterling, however, tempting it might seem to set the HK$ up as an independent currency instead of merely an adjunct of sterling which it has always been, was taking a risk when practically all of Hong Kong's reserves were in sterling. Secondly with the almost total lack of exchange control regulations here speculation against the HK$ (whether as an over or an under valued currency) could be a gnome of Zurich's dream and a Financial Secretary's nightmare. 47 At the end of August 1972 the banks agreed that HSBC would have a monopoly on market intervention to support the exchange rate and discretion over when to intervene. 48 In mid-September Haddon-Cave was in London where he advised the Bank of England and UK Treasury that 'we are trying to explain to Hong Kong banks that the Hong Kong government runs the place, but it is rather difficult'.
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In February 1973 the US$ was further devalued by 10% but the HK$ was kept at its gold parity (revalued against the US$ to HK$5.085-US$1) in order to maintain parity with the RMB. By July 1973 the HK$ was being dragged down against sterling partly by the continued devaluation of the US$ and partly due to the outflow of capital from the colony after the end of the stock exchange boom. 50 The Bank of England wanted to advise Hong Kong to float its currency or at least to revalue against the sinking US$ but the UK Treasury disagreed. 51 During the Summer the RMB was appreciated against the HK$ and the US$ and at the same time RMB-denominated prices of Chinese exports rose dramatically, putting double pressure on Hong Kong's food costs. 54 The reply from the British government was categorical that 'we cannot endorse any diversification of your own official reserves' because of the threat to the global sterling exchange rate arising from the sale of such large sterling balances.
MacLehose and Haddon-Cave set out for London to take on their imperial leaders.
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They left again empty-handed to the dismay of the legislative council, who wrote to the Acting Governor in strong terms that they were 'gravely dissatisfied with the attitude of the British government over a matter which is of vital importance to the economy of Hong Kong'. 56 
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A week before all the sterling agreements were due to expire at the end of is at the basis of the one-country, two currencies system that has sustained the relationship between Hong Kong SAR and the Mainland since 1997 and will continue to be fundamental to future changes in the currency arrangements between these territories. 24 
